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DIVIDING AND CONQUERING:
THE DUALISTIC ROOTS OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND ITS FOES
Corey Beals
Introduction —The Disease

I

was born with a disease. It was in my bloodstream before I was born,
and it was in the food I ate, in the air I breathed, and the water I
drank. Mine is a story of learning that I have a serious disease—an
inherited disease made worse with addictive patterns of my own. It is
a story of awakening to this fact and desiring healing and journeying
toward recovery. But in order to tell this story of my addictive disease,
I will need to tell not only how I got it, but also how it originated long
before I was born, how it spread through our culture, and why it is so
compelling. I also hope to suggest some possible ways of recovering
from this addiction.
The story of my disease is not a solitary story involving me alone.
It is a story of people who developed this disease and gradually
introduced it amongst their own people within several generations.
The gradual introduction of the illness allowed one to live with it
without dying from it. In fact, one of the strange effects of this disease
was that those who had it thought that they were healthier than
people who did not have this disease. So they were eager to spread it
across the world. But when they introduced it suddenly to indigenous
cultures that had never encountered it before, it killed them in large
numbers. The disease I’m talking about is not smallpox. The disease I
am talking about is dualism.

1. Dualism Defined
Since the term dualism gets used in so many different ways and in
so many different contexts, I will more precisely define the type of
dualism to which I am referring. Dualism, as I will be using the term,
takes as a premise what I will call the separability thesis, which has
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roots in Descartes’ famous ‘separability argument’ regarding the body
and soul (from the Descartes’ Sixth Meditation). In this paradigmchanging work of philosophy, Descartes argued that if we could
conceive of the body and soul as distinct from each other, then they
must be independent substances (that is, separable). The argument
says that if I can conceive of the mind without the body, or the body
without the mind, then they are not identical. And if not identical,
then they are separable substances. The unstated assumption at play
in this argument, however, is what I am calling the separability thesis:
If two things are distinguishable, or distinct, then they are separable.
By ‘separable,’ I mean that they can exist independently from each
other as separate substances. The focus is usually on the question of
whether or not these are distinct substances. But Descartes does not
argue for the separability thesis; rather he argued from it. So while
many critics of Descartes might point to his mind-body substance
dualism as one of his worst contributions to culture, I would say it is
the separability thesis.
While presupposing the truth of the separability thesis—that if two
are distinct, then they are separable—Descartes goes on to argue that
the mind and body are distinct. He argues that since he can conceive of
himself as a thinking thing even if he didn’t have a body, and because
he can distinctly conceive of an extended body without having the
capacity to think, those two things (mind and body) are distinct. He
concludes his argument that because “I have a distinct idea of a body,
insofar as it is merely an extended thing and not a thinking thing, it is
certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without
it.”1 This last italicized phrase (italics mine) is where he slips in the
separability thesis as if it were the most obvious truth in the world.
But he does not argue for it. He argues from it. And nearly 500 years
later, that one little phrase continues to shape Western culture as if
it were unquestionably true. And this un-established assumption is
required to make his argument work. A way of presenting the full
argument (complete with the assumption) would be as follows.
1. If two entities are distinct, then they are separable (“can
exist without each other”).
2. The mind and body are distinct from one another.
3. Therefore, the mind and body are separable.
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Most of those who reject Descartes’ dualism do so by rejecting
premise (2) of the argument above. Such arguments might be
motivated by the fact that they intuitively know that the conclusion
(3) is false, so they reject premise (2). There are various ways of
doing this that could all fall into the broad category of monism.
Monism, in general, is the belief that all of reality is just one type of
substance. The monists reject dualism by arguing that the mind and
the body are the same thing. Three of the most notable forms of
monism are materialism, idealism, and pantheism. Materialism argues
that all of reality is just material, and that what appears to be mind is
just reducible to material, and can be entirely explained in terms of
material reality. Idealists, on the other hand, argue that all of reality
can be reduced to ideas in the mind. Idealists explain that material
reality only appears to exist as a separate substance, but that in reality,
everything is just an idea—in the mind of God or in the mind of some
other creature or collective set of creatures. These seem like opposite
views, but they both are types of monism. A third type of monism is
pantheism.2 This is the view that all things are one, whether it appears
to be matter or mind, divine or human—it is all the same. There are no
distinctions between divine and human or between mind and matter
because everything is one, and everything—taken up together—is
divine. While all three of these monist theories of ultimate reality are
vastly different in many respects, they nonetheless share something
significant in common. Each of these views challenges Descartes’
second line in the argument, and each of these view leaves the first,
assumed line of his argument unchallenged.
While dualism is a target of this essay—insofar as I hope to show
the origins and consequences of dualism—the central player of this
essay is the separability thesis. It is this separability thesis that I will
suggest is at the root of much of our current ecological problems.
Before looking further into the roots and consequences of dualism,
though, it will be helpful to identify some examples of the many
different forms that this separability dualism takes.

2. Strains

of

Separability Dualism

One example of separability dualism is the dualism between land
and humans. When I unknowingly lived as a human/land dualist I
acted from the belief that because land and humans are different, I
am entirely separable and independent from the land on which I live.
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It did not matter where I was living—I was the same person wherever
I was. Or so I thought. I acted as if how I treated the land I was
living on or how it treated me were incidental to my existence. And
since I thought that the place I was living and breathing was merely a
secondary property of my existence, it did not occur to me that living
in eight different places in twelve years had any significant bearing on
who I was as a person.
I was not necessarily an abuser of the land, but I definitely saw
it as separable from me. I might avoid dumping gasoline on the
ground—perhaps out of duty, but not because doing so would do any
harm to me. I might be aware that clear-cutting a forest was harmful
ecologically and aesthetically to the land. But the fact that this had any
metaphysical impact on me as a person was foreign to me.
This detachment from the land is made all the more acute by
putting many layers of concrete, pavement, oil, steel and/or plastic
between myself and the land. If I am sitting in a car, I am sitting on
an oil-based plastic which is layered on top of several layers of steel,
which is layered on some oil-based tires, which sit on top of on oilbased pavement, which is layered on crushed gravel which may then
be resting on bull-dozed soil that has removed any unique shape in
favor of a flat surface. Dualism allows us to place many layers of artifice
between ourselves and the soil, and those layers then create a state of
detachment making it easier to further detach from the land. So it is
easy to see how this disease can become more acute over time.
Another strain of separability dualism is individualism, which is
a dualism between the self and the other. This is the view that just
because a person is different or distinguishable from another human,
he is thereby fundamentally separable and independent of that human.
This human/human dualism is very similar to human/land dualism.
And the symptoms are similar as well. Just as I can only mistreat the
land if I think it is separable and independent from me, I can only
mistreat another human if I think that the other human is separate and
independent from myself.
In its earliest and most curable stages, this individualism is simply
selfishness and self-centeredness. That form of individualism is so
obviously immature and vicious that usually one can begin treating
it simply by drawing attention to it. But the most dangerous forms
of individualism are those that become disguised as scientific or
philosophically sophisticated ideologies.

the dualistic roots of environmentalism and its foes

•9

As I studied philosophical theories of the self, whether it was a self
that was metaphysically grounded in freedom or in rationality or in
will-to-power or even in creativity, these theories all were centered on
the individual self. As attractive and noble as a theory of self based in
freedom or rationality may have appeared to me, they each nonetheless
were focused on an autonomous self. Any relational qualities in
these theories came as secondary or tertiary properties of the self.
The relation with the other was not constitutive of one’s core being.
Relations with others—in the leading predominant philosophies I
studied—always came as a secondary extension of the individual. But
common to each of these views I tried on was the assumption that I
was fundamentally distinct from others and was therefore separable
from others metaphysically.

3. The Spread

of

Dualism

It is hard to trace exactly how I discovered the ways in which I was
deeply influenced by dualism. But somewhere in the process of looking
to philosophy for ways to bring more integrity to how I perceived
and lived life, many of the conversations I was reading began to
ring false when it became clear that modern philosophy could not
seem to connect being and doing or the individual and the other.
Despite numerous attempts by brilliant philosophers to derive ethics
from an ontology, none succeeded. Despite the attempt to show that
ethical obligations to the other could be derived from individualistic
accounts of the human being, all of them failed. So that left me
with two apparent options. I could either keep trying to develop an
ontology that entailed ethical responsibility for the other or I could
admit defeat, and concede that since no ethical responsibility could be
derived from an individualist account of the self, ethical responsibility
must not exist as a true reality. The latter seemed ludicrous to me
and assaulted my deepest intuitions, yet the idea of continuing
the heretofore-unsuccessful search for an individualist account by
being more intellectually rigorous than Kant and the rest of them
seemed equally ludicrous. That is what led me to finally question the
assumption that a theory of the self should assume an autonomous self
that is separable from others. That is what prompted me to question
assumptions that I had not even noticed as assumptions—assumptions
common to my culture that I began to see were rooted in philosophies
that had become widespread and commonplace centuries ago. My
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dualism, to a large degree, was inherited. So I began to trace the
genealogy of my disease. And while there was not a single individual,
there were a few who were especially influential in introducing and
spreading this dualistic disease.
There were many philosophers/theorists who applied dualistic
thinking to their respective fields of thought—Thomas Hobbes
applying the dualism of self and other to political theory; Adam Smith
applying the dualism of financial value and moral value to economics;
Isaac Newton applying the dualism of Creator and creation to
science, and Friedrich Schleiermacher applying the dualism of literal
interpretation and metaphorical interpretation to hermeneutics. In a
sense, each of these figures is considered a ‘father’ to his academic
discipline, since the very idea of a discipline that is separable from
other disciplines is another child of dualism. These divisions had a
way of multiplying. But for the purpose of this paper I want to focus
on another father of dualism who may have appeared earlier in the
spread of this disease and had an influence on many of the dualisms
that emerged later. That figure is Francis Bacon. He is often referred
to as the father of the scientific method, and introduced multiple
forms of dualism, not least of which was the dualism between efficient
causality and final causality. Dualism nearly always was part of a larger
sequence of events—dividing and conquering. While dualism divided
two entities previously seen as inseparable, it nearly always followed
that one of the two dyads would be embraced as superior and the
other would be rejected—or at least neglected.
Descartes divided body and mind, and then gave preference to
the mind rejecting the validity of knowledge that was bodily. Hobbes
divided the other from the self, and elevated the self above the
other. After Smith divided moral value from financial value, he set
financial value ‘free’ from any moral influence. After Bacon separated
final causality (or questions of metaphysical purpose) from efficient
causality (or questions of cause and effect), he blatantly dismissed
questions of purpose elevating questions of cause and effect to a place
of sole significance. Bacon was not unclear in the least that he was
dispensing with any form of final causality, and reducing our account
of knowledge to include only efficient causality.
So it should come as no surprise to us that we find Bacon using
the same strategy when it comes to the dualism of humans and nature.
He sought to separate out humans from nature and then to elevate
humans over and against nature. His goal was to use the efficient
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causality (newly freed from final causality) to put Nature through a
sort of Inquisition in which she was questioned in a controlled and
constrained3 setting until she was forced to give up her secrets.4
And in practice, even if this was not the intent of any particular
thinker who first proposed the separability, what seems to have
happened historically in every example of a dualistically divided way
of engaging a field of thought is that one or the other of the separated
dyads becomes elevated as important while the other is either rejected
or neglected. Divide and conquer.

4. Queries
Now that we have looked at dualism, specifically the separability thesis
in which dualism is rooted, and a variety of ways in which this has
been applied, I want to raise a few questions for our consideration.
1. How does the perception of separateness affect us? Perhaps
it does not seem like a problem that we are metaphysically
separable from God, others and the rest of creation. Is it
worth considering the consequences of these dualistic
separations on our relationship as humans with the rest of
creation? If I view myself as different, yet deeply connected
with all of creation, will that have a significant impact on how
I relate to creation in contrast to viewing myself as entirely
detached and separated from all of the rest of creation?
2. If the separability thesis is at the root of our ecological
brokenness, then what is the way to heal this disease? Can
it be solved by merely developing a new ethic? Can it be
solved by merely developing a new hermeneutic? Can it be
solved by merely developing a new theology? If the root of
the disease is a metaphysical one, then it seems that the cure
for the disease must also be a metaphysical one. Perhaps we
do need a new ethic, a new hermeneutic and a new theology,
but if these new theories are not rooted in a non-dualistic
metaphysic, then will the new ethic, hermeneutic or theology
be capable of treating anything more than the symptoms of
the disease? What sort of metaphysical transformation must
take place before the disease rooted in dualism is healed?
3. If we need a new metaphysical understanding of ourselves
and our relationships with God, others and the rest of
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creation, then how will that metaphysical transformation
occur? We may do well to consider how the metaphysical
transformation transpired at the hand of Descartes and
Bacon.
a. How did Descartes use a meditative discourse to change
hearts? (Ironically, the meditation, which is a less
argumentative genre and one that is aimed at taking
both mind and heart on a journey together, was used to
dismiss the validity of the heart in matters of knowledge.)
b. How did Bacon use an imaginative discourse to change
the way people envisioned themselves and their world?
If we are sufficiently convinced of the inherent failure of the separability
dualisms to understand, describe, and relate to God, others, and
the rest of creation, then where do we go from here? Ironically, the
philosophical/theological tradition that has predominated in the West
over the last half millennium has also tended to answer that question
in binary terms, assuming the separability thesis. The answer is either
dualistic or monistic. We have been given two options: 1) We can
embrace difference and be forced to accept separability, or 2) we can
deny separability and be forced to deny difference. But is there a third
option? What if we chose instead to reject the separability thesis and
seek a metaphysical view that goes beyond the usual dichotomy of
dualism and monism? Is it possible to embrace difference and reject
separability at the same time? Is such a view logically and practically
sound?
I think such a space exists. What if such a third way is not only
possible but is the best fit for describing reality? Might it be that this
separability thesis has in fact led to the panoply of ecological crises we
find ourselves facing after trying to deny a third way for so long? If we
move beyond monistic and dualistic thinking to triadic thinking, what
will result? We have given the other two options a full test; is it not
time to accept the consequences of such thinking and try a third way?5

Endnotes
1. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, (1641). Trans. Donald Cress, 4th
Edition. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. Meditation Six, section
78, p. 96. Italics mine.
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2. There are different types of pantheism, and not all of them necessarily qualify as a monist
view. But insofar as a pantheist holds that all of reality is part of one divine Being or one
unified divine substance, then that particular type of pantheism is monist.
3. Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, (1603). Transcribed from the
1893 Cassell & Company edition by David Price.
4. Carolyn Merchant, “The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature” Isis,
2006, 97:513–533
5. I intentionally end this with a query, since I do not have space here to address the
question. I am currently writing a book for Baylor Press in which I am exploring triadic
thinking as an alternative to monism and dualism. Hopefully, this question will inspire
further discussion as we try to find our way out of the problems generated from monistic and dualistic thinking.

